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DEPENDENT CHOICE, PROPERNESS,
AND GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS
DAVID ASPERÓ AND ASAF KARAGILA
Abstract. We show that Dependent Choice is a sufficient choice principle
for developing the basic theory of proper forcing, and for deriving generic
absoluteness for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals, even with
respect to DC-preserving symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. Hence,
ZF+DC not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis,
but is also the right base theory over which to safeguard truth in analysis from
the independence phenomenon in the presence of large cardinals. We also
investigate some basic consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom in ZF, and
formulate a natural question about the generic absoluteness of the Proper
Forcing Axiom in ZF+DC and ZFC. Our results confirm ZF+DC as a natural
foundation for a significant portion of “classical mathematics” and provide
support to the idea of this theory being also a natural foundation for a large
part of set theory.
1. Introduction
The Axiom of Choice is a staple of modern mathematics which requires little
introduction nowadays. However, as the reader is probably aware, the Axiom of
Choice also has some controversial implications, especially in analysis (e.g., the
existence of sets of reals which are not Lebesgue-measurable or without the Baire
property). The controversial aspect of such results, and of the Axiom of Choice
itself, ultimately stems from the non-constructive1 nature of this axiom. Appealing
to the Axiom of Choice means that we are unable to properly construct and define
our objects, but merely prove their existence. To some people this approach is
lacking substance; they would argue that the objects we construct in mathematics
should be explicit. At any rate, effective proofs, or proofs which explicitly exhibit or
construct some object, are perceived almost universally as being more satisfactory
than mere existence proofs.
By weakening the Axiom of Choice to one of its countable variants we obtain
the Principle of Dependent Choice (DC), namely the statement that every partial
order without maximal points has an infinite chain. This axiom is regarded by
most mathematicians as innocuous, as it does not give rise to the construction
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of pathological objects in analysis and elsewhere in mathematics.2 By its very
formulation DC is simply telling us that we can construct things recursively in ω
steps just by showing that the construction may proceed through each successive
step. Even if the object promised to exist is still non-constructive, this level of
non-constructiveness is felt to be a minimum that we should be happy to tolerate
if we are to develop any reasonable mathematics of infinite objects.3 In fact, and
precisely because performing recursive constructions over the natural numbers is
something we do all the time in many areas of mathematics, DC promises to be
a particularly successful axiom in those areas. This is actually true for classical
analysis, most of which can be carried out in the theory ZF+ DC.
The above considerations on the naturalness of DC are meant as a motivational
preamble to the work in the present paper. This is a paper in two parts. The first
part studies to what extent is ZF+ DC an adequate base to develop the theory of
proper forcing, whereas the second part deals with the problem of deriving generic
absoluteness for (some substantial class of) forcing notions in the theory ZF + DC
supplemented with sufficiently strong large cardinal axioms. These two lines of
research may look rather disconnected, but they share a goal, namely to see whether
ZF+ DC, which we have hinted at being a successful foundation for large portions
of classical mathematics, is also a reasonable vantage point from which to look into
more purely set-theoretic areas.
Our motivation for studying properness in ZF + DC originated in the earlier
realization, by the second author, that DC enables one to prove, and in fact is
equivalent to, the existence of countable elementary submodels of Vα, for all infinite
ordinals α;4 in particular, ZF+DC provides a non-vacuous playground in which to
study properness. On the other hand, the goal of our study of generic absoluteness
over the base theory ZF+DC was to elucidate whether or not the use of the Axiom
of Choice in its full power is an overkill for proving generic absoluteness for L(R),
or even for the Chang model, from large cardinals. This question is motivated by
the role played by ZF+DC as a valid base theory for real analysis and the fact that
most of real analysis lives in L(R).5
As already mentioned, ZF + DC is “the right theory for classical analysis”. In
this paper we argue that it is also the right basic theory for handling much of the
forcing technology relevant to the real line. This argument is provided through the
results in the first and second part of this paper. In the first part of the paper we
observe that Dependent Choice is enough—in fact the minimum needed—of the
Axiom of Choice to develop the theory of proper forcing, and that proper forcing
must preserve Dependent Choice. We prove the consistency of the Proper Forcing
Axiom (PFA) by forcing, with a proper forcing notion, over any model of ZF+ DC
in which there is a supercompact cardinal. We also show that assuming PFA, a
stronger version of Dependent Choice, namely DCω1 , must hold. As a consequence,
all typical applications of PFA in ZFC at the level of H(ω2) (see, for example, [3]
2For example, Solovay produced a model of ZF + DC in which all sets of reals are Lebesgue
measurable and have the Baire property ([26]).
3Notably, if we are to develop real analysis in any reasonable way.
4This was most likely observed by many others in the past, as George Boolos made the obser-
vation in [4] that DC is equivalent to the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem.
5Another, less obvious, point of connection between our two lines of research is given by
the fact that the first proof of generic absoluteness from large cardinals in ZFC went through the
construction, assuming the existence of a supercompact cardinal, of a semiproper forcing iteration,
with semiproperness being a natural outgrowth of the notion of properness. At the beginning of
our research we focused on the study of properness and observed the efficiency of ZF+DC in this
context, to the point of allowing one to force the Proper Forcing Axiom from the existence of a
supercompact cardinal. But then, given the above connection, we set to explore whether ZF+DC
could also have something interesting to say regarding generic absoluteness.
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or [22]) also go through in ZF + DC; in particular, PFA implies, in ZF + DC, that
2ℵ0 = ℵ2 and that H(ω2) has a definable well-ordering (Theorem 5.3). We do not
know how to prove that the Proper Forcing Axiom does not imply the Axiom of
Choice,6 but we do suggest a possible way to prove such a statement assuming some
generic absoluteness of the Proper Forcing Axiom (together with reasonable large
cardinal assumptions).
The second part of the paper begins with a (rather lengthy) discussion of the
foundational significance of the generic absoluteness phenomenon. We then observe
that generic absoluteness for the Chang model fails relative to forcing notions de-
stroying DC, and move on to proving that if ZF+DC holds and the supercompact
cardinals form a stationary class in Ord, then the theory of the Chang model is
generically absolute with respect to forcing that preserves Dependent Choice (The-
orem 8.6),7,8 and in fact with respect to DC-preserving symmetric submodels of
DC-preserving forcing extensions (Theorem 9.1). We conclude the paper with some
foundational remarks motivated by the proof of this last result.
1.1. The basic definitions. All our proofs will be carried out in ZF. We will
redefine the notion of H(κ) to work in a context where the Axiom of Choice may
fail. We then use this definition when discussing proper forcing. In our paper a
notion of forcing is a partially ordered set P with a maximum, denoted by 1P (or
just 1). If p, q ∈ P, we say that q extends p, or that it is a stronger condition, if
q ≤ p. If two conditions have a common extension, we say that they are compatible.
Rather than writing P to denote the forcing relation corresponding to a notion of
forcing P, we will omit the subscript and simply write  whenever P is clear from
the context. A forcing P is weakly homogeneous if for every two conditions p and
q there is an automorphism pi such that pip and q are compatible. If P is weakly
homogeneous, then for every p ∈ P and every sentence ϕ in the forcing language
for P, p  ϕ if and only if 1  ϕ. Also, if P and Q are weakly homogeneous forcing
notions, then so is P×Q.
We denote P-names by x˙, and if x is a set in the ground model, we denote the
canonical name for x by xˇ. If x˙ and y˙ are P-names, we say that y˙ appears in x˙ if
there is some condition p such that 〈p, y˙〉 ∈ x˙. We then recursively define
x˙  p = {〈p∗, y˙  p〉 | y˙ appears in x˙, p∗ ≤ p, p∗  y˙ ∈ x˙}.
Not assuming the Axiom of Choice, the terminology, definitions and notations
surrounding cardinals become vague. We consider cardinals in the broader sense:
if x can be well-ordered, then |x| is the least ordinal that has a bijection with x;
otherwise, |x| is the Scott cardinal of x:
|x| = {y | ∃f : x→ y a bijection} ∩ Vα,
for the least α for which the intersection is non-empty. Greek letters (with the
notable exception of ϕ and pi) will denote ordinals, and specifically ℵ numbers
when we assume that they denote infinite cardinals.
We write |x| ≤ |y| to denote that there is an injection from x into y, and |x| ≤∗ |y|
to denote that x is empty or else there is a surjection from y onto x. The notation
6Without assuming the consistency, with ZF + DC, of the existence of a Reinhardt cardinal
with a supercompact cardinal below it.
7Monro showed in [21] that Dependent Choice is not always preserved by forcing in ZF.
8In the ZFC context, the invariance of the theory of the Chang model under set theory in the
presence of large cardinals (one supercompact cardinal, or a proper class of Woodin cardinals, is
enough) is a well-known result of Woodin ([28]).
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|x| < |y| denotes the statement |x| ≤ |y| and |y|  |x|, and |x| <∗ |y| is defined
from ≤∗ similarly.9
Finally, for a set x, the Hartogs number of x is ℵ(x) = min{κ | κ  |x|} and the
Lindenbaum number of x is ℵ∗(x) = min{κ | κ ∗ |x|}.
2. Hereditary sets
Structures of the form H(κ), where κ is a cardinal, are one of the key construc-
tions in set theory. These are usually10 defined as {x | | tcl(x)| < κ}. Assuming
that κ is a regular cardinal, these sets are models of ZFC−, namely all the axioms
of ZFC except the Power Set Axiom (which can hold for “small sets” when κ is
sufficiently large). In almost all the definitions we have we can replace H(κ) with
Vα for “sufficiently nice α”, meaning one where enough of Replacement is satisfied.
But this requires more care in noting what Replacement axioms are being used, and
virtually nobody wants that. Not when a nice alternative like H(κ) is available.
In the absence of the Axiom of Choice, however, we want to have H(κ) reflect
the fact that choice fails. This cannot be done when taking the same definition at
face value, since it implies that if x ∈ H(κ) then x can be well-ordered. This means
that we need to modify the definition of H(κ).
Definition 2.1. Given a set x, H(x) is the class {y | |x| ≮∗ | tcl(y)|}. We denote
by H(<x) the union of the classes H(y) such that |y| <∗ |x|.
Note that for an infinite cardinal κ, H(κ) = H(<κ+) and if κ is a regular limit
cardinal, then H(<κ) = H(κ).
Proposition 2.2. Let κ > ω be an uncountable cardinal. The following properties
hold:
(1) H(κ) is a transitive set of height κ.
(2) H(κ) = Vκ if and only if κ is a strong limit cardinal; in other words,
κ ∗ |Vα| for all α < κ.
(3) If κ is regular, then H(κ) |= ZF−, and if it also a strong limit then H(κ) |=
ZF2.
Proof. Clearly, H(κ) is a transitive class. We want to argue that H(κ) ⊆ Vκ, which
implies that H(κ) is a set. For this we need the following claim: for a set x the
following are equivalent:
(a) The von Neumann rank of x is α.
(b) α = min{β | tcl(x) ∩ Vβ+1 \ Vβ = ∅}.
In other words, if x has rank α, then its transitive closure contains elements of any
rank below α.
We prove this equivalence by ∈-induction on x. Suppose that rank(x) = α. Then
for all β < α there is some y ∈ x such that α > rank(y) ≥ β. By the induction
hypothesis, tcl(y)∩Vγ+1\Vγ 6= ∅ for all γ < β, and therefore tcl(x)∩Vγ+1\Vγ 6= ∅;
moreover y ∈ tcl(x) ∩ Vβ+1 \ Vβ , so indeed α is the minimal ordinal satisfying (b).
On the other hand, assuming (b) it is clear that rank(x) ≥ α. But if rank(x) > α,
then for some y ∈ x the rank of y is at least α, in which case the above argument
shows that tcl(x) ∩ Vα+1 \ Vα 6= ∅, so α is not the minimal ordinal satisfying (b).
9Note that |x| < |y| is equivalent to |x| ≤ |y| and |x| 6= |y|, as the Cantor–Bernstein theorem
is provable in ZF. For ≤∗, however, the dual Cantor–Bernstein theorem is not provable without
choice (see [13], Chapter 11, Problem 8), and so |x| <∗ |y| is in fact a stronger statement than
|x| ≤∗ |y| and |x| 6= |y|.
10Assuming choice, that is.
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Using this equivalence we argue that if rank(x) > κ, then x /∈ H(κ). This is
clear, since tcl(x) can be mapped onto κ by mapping each element to its rank. So
indeed H(κ) ⊆ Vκ, and so H(κ) is a transitive set.
If κ is a strong limit cardinal, then by definition Vα ∈ H(κ) for all α < κ, and
equality follows.
Finally, if κ is regular, and x ∈ H(κ), then every function from x to κ is bounded,
in particular, if f : x → H(κ), then f ∈ H(κ) as well, so H(κ) satisfies second-
order Replacement, and by transitivity of H(κ) we get all the other axioms of
ZF−. And of course, if κ is also a strong limit cardinal, the above implies that
H(κ) = Vκ |= ZF2. 
Unfortunately, despite what we said at the beginning of this section, ZF does not
guarantee that there are any uncountable regular cardinals. This means, in turn,
that we cannot guarantee that H(κ) will satisfy Replacement axioms. Nevertheless,
models of the form H(κ) are somewhat more natural than models of the form Vα,
as they provide us with an ordinal structure which is slightly more “reasonable”
and they will also satisfy Mostowski’s collapse lemma (as opposed to Vω+ω, for
example, which will not).
Remark 2.3. It is interesting to note that the requirement that κ is an ℵ is crucial
for the proof that H(κ) is even a set. The definition can be used with any cardinal
x, but if x is not well-ordered, then |x| ≮∗ κ for any ordinal κ, meaning that
Ord ⊆ H(x). In the definition, we could have artificially cropped H(x) when x
is not well-orderable, in order to ensure that H(x) remains a set, but we want to
somehow reflect the structure of the universe in a natural way and this cropping
seems artificial and not justified by the mathematics at this point.
Question 2.4. Is there any particular use for H(x) for an arbitrary x in ZF? Do
the proper classes H(x) all satisfy any particular weak set theory of interest?
Proposition 2.5. The class {H(<κ) | κ is an ℵ-number} is a continuous filtration
of the universe.
Proof. Trivially this class is a continuous sequence of transitive sets. If x is any set,
then taking κ = ℵ∗(tcl(x)) implies that x ∈ H(κ) = H(<κ+). 
Remark 2.6. It is consistent that ℵ∗(R) = κ is a limit cardinal, in which case
R ∈ H(κ) but R /∈ H(<κ). This is a consequence of the Axiom of Determinacy
(see Exercise 28.16 in [14]), for example, but the consistency of this statement does
not require any large cardinals.11
3. Dependent Choice
Definition 3.1. Let T be a tree, i.e. a well-founded partial order whose lower cones
are chains.
(1) We say that T is κ-closed if for every α < κ, every increasing sequence of
nodes in T indexed by α has an upper bound.
(2) We say that B ⊆ T is a branch if it is a maximal chain, and a cofinal branch
is a branch which meets all the levels of the tree.
Definition 3.2. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. We denote by DCκ the following
statement: Every κ-closed tree without maximal elements has a chain of order type
κ. We use DC<κ to abbreviate ∀λ < κ,DCλ, and for κ = ℵ0 we simply write DC.12
11Adding iω = κ Cohen reals with automorphisms à la Cohen’s first model, and taking the
supports to be generated by sets of size strictly less than κ, the standard proof shows that there
is no surjection from R onto κ, but there is a surjection on any smaller ordinal.
12DC has many known equivalents [11, Form 43].
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Among the basic consequences of DC we have the Axiom of Choice for countable
families of non-empty sets, the countability of every countable union of countable
sets, the regularity of ω1, and many others.
Lemma 3.3. Every well-orderable tree has a maximal chain. In particular, if T
is a κ-closed well-orderable tree without maximal elements, then T has a chain of
order type at least κ.
Proof. Enumerate T and proceed by recursion. 
Theorem 3.4. The following are equivalent:
(1) DC.
(2) The Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for countable languages: every structure
in a countable language has a countable elementary submodel.
(3) For every α ≥ ω and every countable A ⊆ Vα there is a countable elemen-
tary submodel M of Vα such that A ⊆M .
(4) For every α ≥ ω there is a countable elementary submodel M ≺ 〈Vα,∈〉.
The observation that (1) and (2) are equivalent is easy to make, but is attributed
to George Boolos, and appears in [4] as Exercise 13.3.13
Proof. The proof that (1) implies (2) is the usual proof of the Löwenheim–Skolem
theorem, noting that it does not use more than DC. Namely, given a countable14
structure M in a relational language L (every constant and function can be seen
as a relation), we define N ⊆M by recursion:
(1) N0 = ∅.
(2) Suppose that Nk was defined and is countable. For every formula of the
form ∃yϕ(y, ~x), and every finite sequence ~n from Nk, choose yϕ,~n such
that M |= ϕ[yϕ,~n, ~n]. Note that there are only countably many formulae
and countably many finite sequences, so we need to make countably many
choices, which is doable by DC. Then we define
Nk+1 = Nk ∪ {yϕ,~n | ϕ is a formula, ~n ∈ N |~n|k }.
This is again a countable set.
Finally, let N =
⋃
k∈ω Nk. Then N is a countable substructure in the language L.
It is not hard to verify that N ≺M . We needed DC, rather than just the axiom of
choice for countable families of sets, since the definition of each Nk depends on the
previous choices made.
The implications (2) =⇒ (3) and (3) =⇒ (4) are easy and trivial, respectively.
The last implication is obtained by noting that if DC fails, then there is some α
such that DC fails in Vα. Taking a countable elementary submodel M of Vα, there
is some T ∈M such that T is a counterexample to DC. By elementarity, T ∩M is a
subtree of T without maximal elements. Hence, since T ∩M is countable, we may
easily build an infinite branch of T ∩M by recursion using a well-order on T ∩M
(Lemma 3.3). But this is a contradiction. 
Of course, in the above equivalence, we can replace Vα by H(ℵα), or any other
filtration of the universe.
13Other sources online direct to the third edition of the book, which was unavailable to the
authors, but upon examining the fourth and fifth editions, this exercise seems to have been
removed.
14‘Countable’ means of course injectable into ω, and therefore in particular well-orderable.
The fact that the relevant sets are well-orderable is used throughout this proof.
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Part 1. CCC, properness, and forcing axioms without choice
4. Proper Forcing
Definition 4.1. Let P be a notion of forcing. We say that P is proper if for any
sufficiently large κ15 and every countable elementary submodel M ≺ (H(κ),∈,P),
if p ∈ P ∩M , then p has an extension which is M -generic. Namely, there is some
q ≤ p such that for any open dense D ∈M , D ∩M is predense below q.
Without choice properness can be a bit quirky.
Proposition 4.2. The following are equivalent:
(1) DC.
(2) Col(ω, ω1) is not proper.
(3) There exists a forcing which is not proper.
Proof. Assume DC holds and let P be a proper forcing. Suppose f˙ is a name such
that for some condition p ∈ P, p  f˙ : ωˇ → ωˇ1. Let M be a countable elementary
submodel of a large enough H(κ) such that P, p, f˙ ∈M . Since M is an elementary
submodel, ω ∈ M , and therefore for each n < ω, there is a predense set Dn ∈ M
whose conditions all decide the value of f˙(nˇ), which by elementarity is an ordinal
in M . Let q ≤ p be an M -generic condition. Then q must force that the range of
f˙ must in fact lie in M ∩ ω1. However, DC implies that ω1 is regular, and so this
set is bounded. In particular, this means that q forces that f˙ has a bounded range
and therefore is not surjective. In turn this means that for any name f˙ there is
no condition forcing that f˙ is a surjection from ω onto ω1. Therefore DC implies
that no proper forcing can collapse ω1 and, in particular, Col(ω, ω1) is not a proper
forcing.
The implication from (2) to (3) is trivial. Finally, if DC fails, then the definition
of properness holds vacuously by the definition of “sufficiently large κ”, thus making
every forcing proper. 
Remark 4.3. We could have replaced “sufficiently large” by explicitly requiring κ
to be any fixed cardinal such that H(κ) has both the power set of P and the basic
tools needed for defining the forcing relation. One could also define a hierarchy by
saying that P is “proper below κ”, where κ is fixed in the definition of properness,
and then define proper as “for all κ, P is proper below κ”. However, we feel that
the above is a good definition as it is flexible enough to allow for a certain degree
of freedom in choosing κ and it provides us with this nice characterization of DC.
On the other hand, if one decides that it is best to require something explicit
about κ, or stick to the “properness below κ” definition, then the failure of DC at
H(ω1) (e.g. if there is a Dedekind-finite set of reals) will imply that every forcing is
proper, whereas this will not be the case if DC first fails at some point above H(ω1).
So we would be getting an odd equivalence of “every forcing is proper” given that
choice of ‘properness’; avoiding this oddity is a good motivation for picking the
definition of properness as we did above.
Proposition 4.4. Every σ-closed forcing is proper.
Proof. Let P be a σ-closed forcing. If M is a countable elementary submodel of
some H(κ) with P ∈M , then enumerate the dense open sets in M as {Dn | n ∈ ω}
and enumerate P∩M as {pn | n ∈ ω}, and for any p ∈ P∩M , recursively construct
a decreasing sequence such that q0 = p and qn+1 is the least pk such that pk ∈ Dn
and pk ≤ qn. Since P is σ-closed, there is some lower bound q of all the qn’s and it
is clear that q is an M -generic condition. 
15I.e., for a tail of κ.
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One ambition might be to prove that every ccc forcing is proper, but without the
Axiom of Choice chain conditions are tricky to even formulate. Mirna Džamonja
suggested in private communication to the authors to follow Mekler’s footsteps in
[20] and formulate ccc, at least in the presence of DC, by saying that every condition
is M -generic for any countable elementary submodel M . Of course, under this
definition it is trivial that every ccc forcing is proper.
Theorem 4.5. Let X be any set, and let Add(ω,X) denote the forcing whose
conditions are finite partial functions p : X × ω → 2, ordered by reverse inclusion.
Then DC implies that Add(ω,X) is a ccc forcing, for any X.
Of course we can immediately assume that X is not empty, otherwise this is an
atomic forcing, which is entirely uninteresting (and it is certainly proper). This
theorem is also immediately true for any well-orderable set X, as then Add(ω,X)
is also well-orderable and therefore admits maximal antichains and the standard
ZFC arguments work with it without using choice. Nevertheless, we will only use
the assumption that X is not empty in the following proof.
Proof. Suppose that M ≺ H(κ) for any large enough κ such that X, Add(ω,X)
and D are all inM , where D is a dense subset of Add(ω,X). Let p be any condition
in Add(ω,X), and let p′ = p ∩M ∈ M . Then there is some q ∈ D ∩M which is
compatible with p′ by predensity of D. Moreover, dom(p \ p′) ∩M = ∅, so p is
also compatible with q. In other words, ∅, the maximum condition of Add(ω,X),
is M -generic, and so every condition is M -generic, for every M . 
Theorem 4.6. If P is proper and DC holds, then 1  DC.
Proof. Let T˙ be a P-name for a tree of height ω without maximal nodes and let
p ∈ P. Let M be a countable elementary submodel of some sufficiently large H(κ)
such that T˙ , p, P ∈M .
Let q be an M -generic condition extending p and let T˙∗ = M ∩ T˙ . For each
n < ω, let Dn be the collection of conditions p ∈ P for which there is some P-name
t˙ such that p  “t˙ is a node in T˙ of level n”. For every n, Dn is a dense subset of P
in M . Hence, Dn∩M is predense below q for each n, and as a consequence q forces
that T˙∗ is a subtree of T˙ of height ω. By a similar argument, we also have that q
forces T˙∗ not to have any maximal nodes. But then, since of course T˙∗ is forced to
be countable, q forces that T˙∗ has a branch by Lemma 3.3. We have shown that
every condition in P can be extended to a condition adding a branch through T˙ ,
which means that 1  DC. 
The above theorem shows that one cannot violate DC with a proper forcing,
which is somewhat similar to the fact that one cannot violate AC with any forcing.
This fact provides an argument that ZF + DC is a good base theory for working
with proper forcing. This argument is strengthened by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. (1) Two-step iterations of proper forcings are proper.
(2) Countable support iterations of proper forcings are proper.
Proof. If DC fails, then this holds vacuously. If DC holds, the usual proofs as given
in the context of ZFC also work here, noting that all relevant countable choices
in the ZFC proofs can equally be made in the present context; for a reference see
Theorem 2.7 in [1]. However, the following caveat is needed here.
In ZFC we usually define the iteration P∗Q˙ as a partial order on the collection of
ordered pairs of the form 〈p, q˙〉, where p ∈ P and q˙ is a P-name such that 1  q˙ ∈ Q˙.
We could replace this with p  q˙ ∈ Q˙, and while for a two-step iteration this is
entirely inconsequential, for a countable support iteration this matters a lot.
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Moving from p  q˙ ∈ Q˙ to 1  q˙ ∈ Q˙ usually requires the Axiom of Choice. But
we can circumvent this as follows: if q˙ is a name which appears in Q˙ and p  q˙ ∈ Q˙,
then define q˙∗ as
⋃{1Q p′ | p′ ⊥ p}∪ q˙p, and easily 1  q˙∗ ∈ Q˙ and p  q˙∗ = q˙. 
5. The Proper Forcing Axiom
Definition 5.1. The Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA) states that if P is a proper
forcing, then for every collection D = {Dα | α < ω1} of dense open subsets of P
there exists a D-generic filter.
Proposition 5.2. PFA implies DCω1 .
Proof. Let T be a σ-closed tree of height ω1 and with no maximal elements. Then
by Proposition 4.4, T is proper. Consider Dα = T \ T  α, for α < ω1. Then Dα
is a dense open set, so by PFA there is a generic filter meeting each Dα, which is a
branch in T . 
Theorem 5.3. PFA implies that 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 = ℵ2 and that there is a well-order of
H(ℵ2) of length ω2 definable over H(ℵ2) from parameters.
Proof. First note that by DCω1 , we have that ℵ1 ≤ 2ℵ0 , and applying PFA to the
binary tree 2<ω we get that ℵ1 < 2ℵ0 . Moreover, by DCω1 we can choose a ladder
system on ω1, i.e., a sequence 〈Cα | α < ω1 is a limit ordinal〉 such that each Cα is
a cofinal subset of α of order type ω. It then also follows that there is a sequence
〈Sα | α < ω1〉 of pairwise disjoint stationary subsets of ω1.
Next we want to point out that Moore’s proof that the Mapping Reflection
Principle (MRP) implies that 2ℵ0 = 2ℵ1 = ℵ2 in [22] can be repeated under PFA
even without choice. The following changes with respect to the proof as presented
in Moore’s paper are necessary:
(1) Require that cf(θ) > ω1 in the statement of MRP (Definition 2.3).
(2) Replace H((2ω1)+) with H(ℵ∗(2ω1)) in Lemma 4.4.
(3) Note that the existence of a ladder system and DCω1 are enough for the
proofs of Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 to go through. 
Thus, PFA implies H(ω2) |= AC and hence that all the richness of the usual ZFC
combinatorics is available to this structure.
Remark 5.4. One could argue that the correct formulation of forcing axioms (and
PFA specifically) should require that <2ℵ0 dense open sets admit a filter meeting
them all, and add that ℵ1 6= 2ℵ0 to avoid trivialities. In that case in models of
ZF + DC + (|x| < 2ℵ0 → |x| ≤ ℵ0), e.g. in Solovay’s model (see [26]) or models
of AD, this type of axiom holds vacuously since by DC every countable family of
dense open sets admits a filter meeting them, and every collection of strictly less
than 2ℵ0 sets is necessarily countable. We feel that this vacuity is a good reason
not to adopt such a definition.
Of course, we can replace<2ℵ0 by<∗2ℵ0 , namely require that there is a surjective
map from the continuum onto the family of dense open sets but there is no surjection
in the other direction. Since there is a surjection from the continuum onto ω1, and
we require that 2ℵ0 6= ℵ1, there is no surjection in the other direction. Therefore
formulating PFA this way implies that every collection of ℵ1 dense open sets admits
a generic filter. This is enough to prove DCω1 , and the above arguments then imply
that 2ℵ0 = ℵ2.
Even weakening PFA to Martin’s Axiom (assuming DC and defining ccc as “every
condition is M -generic for every countable model M”), the corresponding forcing
axiom applied to Add(ω,X), which is a ccc forcing by Theorem 4.5, would imply
that if there is a surjection from the continuum onto X, then either there is a
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surjection from X onto the reals or there is an injection from X into the continuum.
And in particular ℵ1 < 2ℵ0 .
We finish this section with the outline of the consistency of PFA relative to a
supercompact cardinal in ZF+ DC.
Definition 5.5 (Woodin, Definition 220 in [29]). For an ordinal α we say that
κ is Vα-supercompact if there exists some β > α and an elementary embedding
j : Vβ → N such that:
(1) N is a transitive set and NVα ⊆ N ,
(2) the critical point of j is κ (in particular j is non-trivial),
(3) α < j(κ).
If κ is Vα-supercompact for all α, we say that it is a supercompact cardinal.
Assuming the Axiom of Choice holds, this definition is of course equivalent to
the standard definition by deriving fine and normal measures from the elementary
embeddings.
Proposition 5.6. If κ is a supercompact cardinal, then the countable support it-
eration of length κ using lottery sums of counterexamples to PFA of minimal rank
forces PFA in ZF+ DC.
This approach to the consistency of PFA is due to Philipp Schlicht and is unpub-
lished. It appears in Julian Schölder’s masters thesis, [24], where it is also extended.
For the convenience of the reader, we sketch below the idea behind the proof.
Proof. We define an iteration Pα for α ≤ κ, which is a countable support iteration,
and in which the αth iterand is the lottery sum of all names of counterexamples to
PFA of minimal rank <κ (if these exist; otherwise it is the trivial forcing).
If PFA does not hold in the generic extension, let Q be a rank-minimal coun-
terexample and D = {Dα | α < ω1} be a collection of dense open sets witnessing
that PFA fails. Let Q˙ and D˙ be names for Q and D, respectively, and let p ∈ Pκ
force that Q˙ and D˙ form a counterexample to PFA of minimal rank. Choose η to be
a large enough ordinal such that the above is true in Vη and there is an elementary
embedding j : Vη → N with critical point κ and such that j(κ) is above the rank
of Q˙ and D˙, where N is transitive and sufficiently closed. In particular we may
assume that Q˙, D˙ ∈ N .
By the definition of our iteration and the closure of N , we may extend p, in j(Pκ),
to a condition p′ which, at stage κ, selects Q˙ among the choices of the lottery at that
stage. Let H be a j(Q)-generic filter over N such that p′ ∈ H and let G = H ∩ Pκ.
By a standard lifting argument, j : Vη → N lifts to an elementary embedding from
Vη[G] to N [H], which we will also denote by j. Let I be the Q˙G-generic filter over
V given by H. We may assume that N [H] contains j“Vα for some α containing all
relevant names of conditions in Q˙, and hence that it contains I ′ := j“I. But the
interpretation of I ′ by H generates a filter of j(Q˙)H meeting all members of j(D˙)H .
It follows that p′ does not force, in j(Pκ) and over N , that j(Q˙) and j(D˙) form a
counterexample to PFA, and therefore neither does p. But then, by elementarity
of j, p does not force, in Pκ and over Vη, that Q˙ and D˙ form a counterexample to
PFA, which is a contradiction. 
6. Does PFA imply the Axiom of Choice?
Probably not. In fact, if δ < κ are such that δ is supercompact and κ is a
Reinhardt cardinal, then forcing PFA via a forcing P ⊆ Vδ as in Proposition 5.6 will
preserve the Reinhardtness of κ.
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We would have liked, of course, to produce a model of PFA without the Axiom of
Choice starting from a more reasonable assumption (in the region of supercompact
cardinals). However, this seems to be a much more difficult task than one would
originally expect it to be. We believe that outlining this difficulty is constructive,
and raises some interesting questions about the absoluteness of PFA even between
models of ZFC.
The “obvious construction” would be to start with a model of ZFC + PFA, and
then construct a symmetric extension ‘à la the first model Cohen’ (see Chapter 5
in [13]), using Add(ω2, ω2) as our forcing,16 thus obtaining an intermediate model
which is closed under ω1-sequences. Using the König–Yoshinobu Theorem from
[17], the full generic extension must satisfy PFA, so the intermediate model should
too.
However, when getting down to brass tacks, one sees that the question is this: If
P is a proper forcing, is P also proper in a larger model which agrees on the same
ω1-sequences?
This leads us to a very interesting question, which even in the context of ZFC
has no obvious answer:
Question 6.1. Suppose that P is an ω2-directed-closed forcing and 1  PFA. Does
that mean that PFA holds in the ground model?
Of course, to make our example, we would need to argue with a proof in a model
of ZF + DCω1 , rather than a model of ZFC. But we are optimistic that a proof in
ZFC will also work—mutatis mutandis—in ZF+ DCω1 .
When approaching the above question, it seems that an easy way to solve it
would be to prove the following statement: if Q is an ω2-directed-closed forcing
and P is proper, then 1Q Q “Pˇ is proper”. Yasuo Yoshinobu proved that even in
ZFC, this question admits a negative answer.
Theorem 6.2 (Yoshinobu [32]; ZFC). Given a regular cardinal κ > ω, there is
a forcing of the form Add(ω, 1) ∗ Col(ω1, 2κ) ∗ Q˙, where Q˙ is a ccc forcing, which
collapses ω1 after forcing with Add(κ, 1).
Part 2. Generic Absoluteness without Choice
7. Motivation and limitations
As mathematicians, we would like to have a foundation of mathematics T which,
apart from having other virtues, is powerful enough that it answers all, or most of,
the questions we may be naturally interested in when doing mathematics. There
is widespread agreement that set theory provides a universal language to do math-
ematics: we imagine an entity, V , that we think of as ‘the set-theoretic universe’,
i.e., the collection of all pure sets,17 and observe that every question in mathematics
seems to be translatable into a question about what holds true in the set-theoretic
universe. Hence, it is just natural to try to find such a foundation of mathematics
phrased in the language of set theory. To be clear, this foundation of mathematics
should be a first order theory T in the language of set theory which, besides having
the desired virtues—e.g., we would like to have some evidence that the description
of V given by T is in fact consistent—is such that we can prove, for a variety of
16In this forcing conditions are partial functions p : ω2 × ω2 → 2 whose domain is of size at
most ℵ1, ordered by reverse inclusion.
17The intuition is that ‘pure sets’ should be collections consisting only of sets, all of which sets
should themselves have this property, and so on. When trying to make sense of this intuition,
we are naturally led to the idea of pure sets being precisely the members of the set-theoretic
cumulative hierarchy.
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natural mathematical statements σ we may potentially be interested in, that every
model of T is a model of σ (or that every model of T is a model of ¬σ).
The standard axiomatic system for set theory, ZFC, has the virtues18 one would
expect from a satisfactory foundation of mathematics. However, and since ZFC
is computable and interprets Peano arithmetic, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem
tells us that this theory is incomplete if it is consistent, and that in fact there are
arithmetical statements that the theory does not decide. Moreover, any consistent
strengthening of ZFC obtained by adding finitely many axioms to it will be affected
by the incompleteness phenomenon in exactly the same way.
Large cardinal axioms are a family of ‘natural’ principles, intending to supple-
ment ZFC and asserting the existence of some very high cardinals κ with strong
properties of some sort.19 They tend to be phrased as reflection principles for V ,
or as principles which one can prove20 to be equivalent to second order statements
about V asserting the existence of elementary embedding, different from the iden-
tity, from V into some submodel M , and where M has strong closure properties
within V . These axioms tend to be linearly ordered, in the sense that for any two
such axioms ψ0 and ψ1, it is usually the case that one of the corresponding theories,
say ZFC + ψ1, proves the consistency of ZFC + ψ0, and in fact the existence of a
rank-initial segment of the universe satisfying ZFC + ψ0, or vice versa.21 Thus,
these axioms form a hierarchy of more and more daring principles, stretching from
just ZFC, all the way up to inconsistency.22 Historically, the motivation behind
large cardinal axioms has come from a variety of sources. In any case, a general
underlying motivation for these axioms is the intuition that the set-theoretic uni-
verse ought to be very large. We should point out that here we are dealing with a
truly open-ended family of principles.23 In particular, there is no ‘official’ definition
of large cardinal axiom, but set-theorists surely recognize such axioms when they
meet them.
It seems to be an empirical fact that every consistent theory T occurring in
mathematical practice can be interpreted in ZFC+ψ for some large cardinal axiom
ψ, where this is understood at least in the weak sense of there being a large cardinal
axiom ψ such that ZFC + ψ proves the consistency of T .24 Moreover, given that
large cardinal axioms tend to be linearly ordered in the way we mentioned, the sets
of Π01 sentences implied by consistent large cardinal axioms (tend to) form a linearly
ordered sequence, under inclusion, of sets of true Π01 sentences. These two points
together suggest the appealing picture of an open-ended increasing sequence of Π01-
theories of arithmetic, each one of them characterized as the set of Π01 theorems of
ZFC together with some consistent large cardinal axiom, and whose union is the
true Π01-theory of N. The suggestion that the Π01-theory of N is actually given by the
union of these Π01-theories is justified by the contention that every true Π01 sentence
ought to be implied by some consistent reasonable theory T possibly occurring in
18About which we will not say anything here.
19See [14] for a lot of historical and mathematical information on these cardinals.
20Over conservative second order extensions of ZFC.
21On the other hand, by Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem, none of these theories proves
its own consistency, provided they are in fact consistent.
22A natural closure point of this hierarchy, namely the existence of a nontrivial elementary
from V into V itself, was in fact proposed by Reinhardt in the late 1960’s, and proved, a few years
later, to be inconsistent by Kunen ([18]).
23This is in accord with their spirit: every notion of ‘largeness’ should be strictly subsumed by
an even stronger such notion.
24This is of course not a mathematical assertion as it refers to mathematical practice and as
we do not have any precise definition of ‘large cardinal axiom’ (see above).
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mathematical practice,25 together with the empirical fact, mentioned above, that if
σ is a Π01 theorem of such a theory T , then there is a large cardinal axiom ψ with
the property that every model M of ZFC+ψ contains a model N of T . N need not
be an ω-model from the point of view of M , but the fact that σ holds in N entails
that it also holds in M . We could in fact use this picture as a guiding principle
when thinking about the upper reaches of the large cardinal hierarchy.26
The bad news is that there are very natural mathematical questions beyond
Π01-arithmetic, the answer to which is independent from any genuine large cardinal
axiom. The most prominent such question, already asked by Cantor, is perhaps
the question whether CH, i.e., 2ℵ0 = ℵ1, is true or, more generally, the Continuum
Problem, i.e., the question “How many real numbers are there”?27 Using Cohen’s
method of forcing one can prove that it is consistent, relative to ZFC, to assume
that 2ℵ0 takes the value ℵ1, or ℵ2, or ℵω1 , or indeed ℵα for many other choices of
α. In fact, the same is true if we replace ZFC with ZFC together with any large
cardinal axiom: one can, for example, force both 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 and 2ℵ0 = ℵ2 by a rather
small forcing P, and all large cardinals there might be in the universe with retain
their large cardinal properties in the extension by P (as was shown by Azriel Levy
and Robert Solovay in [19]).
Set-forcing or, more generally, class-forcing, is indeed an extremely powerful
method for, starting with some model M of (sufficiently many) axioms of ZFC,
producing another model of set theory satisfying some interesting statement (see
[25]). This is effected by building a generic extension M [G] ⊇ M of M . The
other main method we have for producing models of set theory is to construct
carefully chosen submodels of the universe (inner model theory). In fact, as things
stand at present, the forcing method and the construction of inner models of set
theory are essentially the only methods we have for proving independence results,
over base set theories—of the form ZFC + ψ for some large cardinal axiom ψ—
about the infinite.28 It is therefore natural, from an empiricist standpoint, to
seek to distil mathematical truth by isolating axioms—beyond ZFC—which make
reasonable portions of the truth predicate of the universe immune, to some extent,
to the method of forcing. V = L is just such an axiom, and in fact it completely
rules out any intromission whatsoever of the method of forcing (this includes generic
extensions via class-forcing); the reason being, of course, that no non-trivial forcing
extension of L will satisfy V = L. But V = L is not regarded as a good axiom by
most set-theorists, as it is a minimality hypothesis incompatible with most large
cardinal axioms (e.g., if V = L, then there are no measurable cardinals). In fact,
it is usually the case, for typical (canonical) inner models M , that the view that
V = M is seen to impose undesirable minimality constraints on the universe—most
notably incompatibility with large cardinal axioms—that disqualify the answers to
mathematical questions derived from V = M as the true answers. This in effect
leaves the construction of forcing extensions as the only method we feel we should
25By ‘reasonable theory possibly occurring in mathematical practice’ we mean a mathematical
theory, compatible with general set-theoretic principles, and which mathematicians could possibly
come up with.
26Of course, the actual dividing line between those large cardinal axioms which are consistent
and those which are not will always remain a sort of epistemological blindspot.
27Unlike CH, all known independent arithmetical statements we have been referring to in the
previous paragraph—Gödel-style self-referential sentences, consistency statements, or for exam-
ple the Paris–Harrington theorem—are either meta-mathematical statements about theories or,
ultimately, artifacts designed to prove the incompleteness of some base theory.
28On the other hand, and as already mentioned, there is certainly independence in arithmetic
(e.g. Gödel sentences), about which forcing has nothing to say, at least directly. However, and as
we already pointed out, at least Π01 statements seem to be decided, in a coherent way, by suitable
large cardinal axioms. And in any case arithmetic is after all the mathematical study of the finite.
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worry about when it comes to deciding on the truth value—in the context of ZFC
enhanced with large cardinal axioms—of statements about the infinite.29
Arguably, the picture presented in the previous paragraph could change quite
dramatically if Woodin’s Ultimate-L project eventually succeeds (see [31]). This
project aims at constructing a canonical inner model M for a supercompact cardi-
nal, and such an inner model would in fact absorb most ‘classical’ large cardinals
there might exist in V above the supercompact cardinal of M . If this inner model
can in fact be constructed, then the axiom V = Ultimate-L would be compati-
ble with at least most large cardinal hypotheses, and it would be immune to the
method of forcing in the same way that the axiom V = L is. We should point out
that we already have axioms which are compatible with all consistent large cardinal
axioms and which, when added to ZFC, also completely neutralize the method of
set-forcing. The assertion that there is a proper class of supercompact cardinals
which are indestructible under directed closed forcing is one such axiom.30 Let us
call this axiom A. In fact, if κ is a supercompact cardinal and P is a forcing notion
of size less than κ, then κ is not indestructible by <κ-directed closed forcing after
forcing with P ([7]).31 In any case, V = Ultimate-L would be incomparably more
effective than an axiom like A. Indeed, V = Ultimate-L would effectively answer
many questions about the set-theoretic universe (e.g., it would imply that 2ℵ0 = ℵ1
and in fact ♦ω1 holds, etc.), whereas A has nothing to say about these facts: if there
is a proper class of supercompact cardinals, then one can construct a class-sized
partial order forcing A together with CH, or with 2ℵ0 = ℵ2, etc. Nevertheless, and
however things turn out with V = Ultimate-L, one can naturally object to this
axiom, and of course also to axioms like A, on the ground that they only neutralize
set-forcing for vacuous reasons; namely, because the axiom fails in any non-trivial
generic extension by set-forcing. That was of course also the case for the axiom
V = L. We are not impressed with a strategy for arguing for the truth of some
statement if this strategy consists in dogmatically banning any methods to show
the independence of the statement, especially if these methods are compatible with
the standard views about V (e.g., maximality, etc.).
The above methodological considerations justify the search for principles, ψ,
which, when added to our standard foundation with large cardinals T , decide some
significant fragment of the truth predicate of V not in first order logic, but in the
stronger logic naturally associated to the forcing method. In other words, we want
ψ to imply,32 for every member σ of some reasonable class Σ of sentences, that
every forcing extension M [G] of every model M of T satisfies σ (or that every
forcing extensions M [G] of every model M of T satisfies ¬σ). We then say that ψ
proves generic absoluteness for Σ. Such principles ψ would be natural axioms in
that they would provide an effectively complete picture of V , at least for sentences
in Σ, in the sense of this picture being complete with respect to, essentially, our
only method for proving independence over T . Furthermore, it would be desirable
that these principles do not render our strong logic degenerate, i.e., it would be
desirable to have that ψ holds in many generic extensions M [G] of models M of T .
Fortunately we do have axioms which are compatible with all consistent large
cardinal hypotheses, which imply some substantial amount of generic absoluteness,
and which furthermore do so for interesting (non-dogmatic) reasons. In fact, as
29There is in principle another way to use the method of forcing to prove independence, namely
the construction of symmetric submodels of forcing extensions. However, this move is not available
when the base theory relative to which we are proving independence is ZFC (see the beginning of
section 9 for an elaboration on this).
30This was pointed out by Gunter Fuchs and Joel D. Hamkins.
31A does not neutralize class-forcing, though.
32In first order logic.
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Woodin proved ([28]), large cardinals themselves do exactly that; for example, the
existence, in ZFC, of a proper class of Woodin cardinals has exactly this effect, as
it renders the theory of the inner model L(R)—and in fact of the Chang model (see
Definition 7.1)—invariant under generic extensions by set-forcing, and as of course
the axiom survives any set-forcing extension. Hence, large cardinals not only seem
to decide first order arithmetic, in first order logic. They are in fact proved to
also decide second order arithmetic, and actually the theory of the Chang model,
in the logic of forcibility (stronger than first order logic but the next natural logic
to give our attention to given our available methods). Moreover, this theory is
already completely decided by the axiom asserting the existence of a proper class
of Woodin cardinals. This fact provides a powerful additional argument in favour,
in the context of ZFC, of large cardinal axioms, at least in the region of a proper
class of Woodin cardinals.
What we have said so far should be enough to motivate those subscribing to
the universist approach, namely the point of view that there is one real universe,
which our axioms should aim at describing. But generic absoluteness is important
for those subscribing to the pluralist or the multiversist approaches as well. In
this type of approaches, one shifts the focus of attention from the notion of one
unique universe of set theory to a plurality of competing universes of set theory,
naturally generated by applying (some of) our methods for proving independence
over a standard foundation. The independence phenomenon has made the actual
set-theoretic universe into an elusive, or inaccessible, entity. Hence, set-theorists
have been effectively forced to familiarizing themselves with the corresponding mul-
tiverse(s), which after all are the object they can access. Given the prevalence of
the forcing method in set theory, the generic multiverse, i.e., the collection of uni-
verses of set theory generated from a given universe by iterating the operations
of taking set-generic extensions and ground models, has been the main object of
attention in multiverse set theory. It is a remarkable fact about the generic mul-
tiverse that if we start with a model M of ZFC and build a set-forcing extension
M [G] of it, the ground model M is definable in M [G] from some parameter. In
fact, we can uniformly define all the ground models, from parameters, and in fact
all the ground models of all generic extensions. Hence, we can simulate talk about
the generic multiverse within any of its members M ; for example, given any n, we
can define Σn-truth in the generic multiverse, i.e., the Σn-sentences which are true
in all members of the generic multiverse, inside M (see [30] for more details).
The generic multiverse both provides a concrete mathematical arena to debate
foundational views in mathematics33 and, because of its foundational value, it has
also become a mathematical object of interest. To cite an example of mathematical
work done on the generic multiverse with an eye on foundations, Hamkins and Löwe
have studied the modal logic of forcing, where this is understood as the modal logic
corresponding to looking at the generic multiverse as a Kripke frame where the
accessibility relation is given by ‘N is a set-generic extension of M ’ (see [8]).
Using the generic multiverse language, the generic absoluteness phenomenon can
be used to provide a bridge between various possible positions in the universist vs.
multiversist debate in the foundations of set theory. The first illustration of this that
comes to mind is the following: As we mentioned, the presence, in some members of
the the generic multiverse (equivalently, in all of its members), of a proper class of
sufficiently strong large cardinals (e.g. Woodin cardinals) implies that the truth of
33For example, a view as the one expressed by Feferman in [5], that a statement like the
Continuum Hypothesis does not have a definite truth, can be naturally argued for using the
language provided by the generic multiverse; in this case, the argument would, at least in part,
appeal to the fact that neither CH nor its negation are true across the generic multiverse truth,
i.e., each of CH and ¬CH is true in some members of the generic multiverse and false in others.
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the Chang model is invariant across the generic multiverse, whereas this is not the
case for CH. This suggests seeing the theory of the Chang model as ‘more definite’
or ‘truer’ than the theory of, say, H(ω2) (where CH lives). That in turn suggests
seeing the Chang model as ‘more real’ than H(ω2). According to such a view,
reality about the set-theoretic universe would come in degrees, with a fragment of
the universe being more real than another if there is less variation of the theory of
the former, across the generic multiverse, than of the theory of the latter.34
It is now a good time to define Chang models in general.
Definition 7.1. Let κ be an ordinal. The κ-Chang model, denoted by Cκ, is the
⊆-minimal model of ZF containing all the ordinals and closed under κ-sequences.
This model can always be constructed as L(Pκ+(Ord)). In the case where κ = ω,
we omit ω from the terminology and notation, and refer to it as the Chang model.
In the following section we will prove that under suitable large cardinal assump-
tions, the theory of the Chang model is generically absolute under forcings which
preserve DC. In other words, assuming sufficiently strong large cardinals exist, if
P is a forcing which preserves DC, e.g. a proper forcing, and G ⊆ P is a V -generic
filter, then the theory of the Chang model in V and V [G] is the same, even if we
add reals as parameters. The foundational motivation for this work is the following:
As has already been mentioned, most of real analysis lives inside L(R), and there-
fore in the Chang model,35 and can be carried out in ZF + DC. This means that
ZF + DC is a very natural meta-theory for analysis. On the other hand, we have
made a case for the desirability of generic absoluteness. These two points together
make it natural to enquire whether or not full AC is an overkill when it comes to
deriving generic absoluteness for L(R) or even for the Chang model (modulo large
cardinals), in the same way that, say, CH or ¬CH are indeed overkills when deriving
generic absoluteness for these inner models with ZFC as base theory.
It is important to realize that non-trivial instances of generic absoluteness for
the Chang model may be blocked unless we restrict our considerations to forcing
notions preserving DC:
Proposition 7.2. The Chang model cannot have generic absoluteness for its Σ2
theory in ZF, even in the presence of large cardinals.
Proof. Suppose that V is a model of ZFC and κ is a supercompact cardinal (or
extendible, or any other not-yet inconsistent large cardinal). Perform a Feferman–
Levy style construction taking the symmetric collapse of Col(ω1, <ℵω1) (see Sec-
tion 4 in [10] for details).
This provides us with a model M of ZF + DC where κ is still a supercompact
cardinal in the sense of Definition 5.5,36 and M |= cf(ω2) = ω1; moreover any
countable sequence of ordinals in M belongs to the ground model V . Therefore the
Chang model C in M is the same as in V .
Working in M , let G be an M -generic filter for Col(ω, ω1). Then in M [G] we
have that ωM [G]1 = ωM2 and therefore M [G] |= cf(ω1) = ω. This fact is reflected
to C since it is witnessed by a countable sequence of ordinals, despite the fact that
Col(ω, ω1) has size ℵ1 (without using any choice!) and thus is strictly less than κ.
However, cf(ω1) = ω is a Σ2 statement over the Chang model. 
34The perception that H(ω1) is ‘more real than’ H(ω2) seems in fact to be widespread among
mathematicians working outside of set theory.
35Note that L(R) is in fact a definable inner model of the Chang model.
36The fact that the elementary embeddings from the ground model lift follows from Theo-
rem 4.9 in [9]. While the proof there does nothing to prove the needed closure properties of these
lifted embeddings, this is not hard to verify by hand.
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Remark 7.3. The above proof shows of course that if κ is, say, a supercompact
cardinal in the ZFCmodel V , then there is a symmetric extensionM satisfying DC in
which κ remains supercompact and such that Σ2-generic absoluteness for the Chang
models fails between M and the Col(ω, ω1)-extension of M (which in the above
situation kills DC). Hence, there is no hope for proving Σ2-generic absoluteness
for the Chang model in general over the base theory ZF+DC unless we restrict to
forcings preserving DC, e.g. proper forcings.
Question 7.4. Can generic absoluteness for L(R) fail, in the presence of large
cardinals, without the requirement that DC is preserved? Moreover, is it at all
possible, assuming the existence of R#, that ω1 be singular in L(R)?
8. Generic absoluteness for the Chang model
Given an infinite regular cardinal λ and a non-empty set X, Col(λ,<X) is the
forcing, ordered by reverse inclusion, of all functions p such that |dom p| < λ,
dom p ⊆ λ × X, and p(α, x) ∈ x for all α < λ and x ∈ X. It is straightforward
to see that Col(ω,<X) is weakly homogeneous and that forcing with Col(ω,<X)
adds surjections from ω onto all members of X.
The following technical lemma, Lemma 8.1, is a rendering of [29], Theorem 226.
This lemma will be crucially used in the proof of Lemma 8.2 (and of Lemma 8.4).
Lemma 8.1 (Woodin; ZF + DC). Suppose κ is a supercompact cardinal and
P ∈ Vκ is a forcing notion preserving DC. There is then a strictly increasing
sequence 〈κξ | ξ < κ〉 of strongly inaccessible cardinals below κ, together with a
sequence 〈Qξ | 1 ≤ ξ ≤ κ〉 of forcing notions and a sequence 〈Q˙Pξ | 1 ≤ ξ ≤ κ〉 of
P-names for forcing notions, satisfying the following conditions.
(1) κ0 is such that P ∈ Vκ0 and such that
• Col(ω1, <Vκ0) forces DC<κ0 over Vκ, and
• P forces that Col(ω1, <Vκ0 [G˙P]) forces DC<κ0 over Vκ[G˙P].
Also,
• Q1 = Col(ω1, <Vκ0), and
• Q˙P1 is a P-name for Col(ω1, <Vκ0 [G˙P]).
(2) For every ξ > 0, letting γξ = sup{κξ′ | ξ′ < ξ}, κξ is such that
• Qξ forces that Col(γξ, <Vκξ [G˙Qξ ]) forces DC<κξ over Vκ, and
• P ∗ Q˙Pξ forces that Col(γξ, <Vκξ [G˙P∗Q˙P
ξ
]) forces DC<κξ over Vκ[G˙P].
Also,
• Qξ+1 = Qξ ∗ Col(γξ, <Vκξ [G˙Qξ ]), and
• Q˙Pξ+1 is a P-name for Q˙Pξ ∗ Col(γξ, <Vκξ [G˙Q˙P
ξ
]).
(3) For every limit ξ, Qξ is the Easton limit of 〈Qξ′ | ξ′ < ξ〉 and Q˙Pξ is a
P-name for the Easton limit of 〈Q˙Pξ′ | ξ′ < ξ〉.
(4) For every ξ < κ, if H ⊆ Qξ is V -generic (resp., if H ′ ⊆ QPξ is V [G]-
generic), then Qκ/H is κξ-closed in V [H] (resp., QPκ/H is κξ-closed in
V [G][H ′]).
(5) For every δ < κ such that P ∈ Vδ, if δ is supercompact in V (in V P), then
κδ = δ and δ remains supercompact after forcing with Qκ over V (after
forcing with P ∗ Q˙Pκ over V ).
(6) If H ⊆ Qκ is V -generic, then Vκ[H] |= ZFC.
(7) If G ⊆ P is V -generic and H ⊆ QPκ is V [G]-generic, then Vκ[G][H] |= ZFC.
Lemma 8.2 and its companion, Lemma 8.4, are the key ingredients in the proof
of Theorem 8.5.
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Lemma 8.2 (ZF + DC). Suppose δ < κ are supercompact cardinals, P ∈ Vδ is
a forcing notion preserving DC, and G ⊆ P is a V -generic filter. Then there is,
in some outer model, a V [G]-generic filter K ⊆ Col(ω,<Vδ), together with an
elementary embedding
j : CVκ[G] → CVκ[G][K]
Proof. Let G ⊆ P be a V -generic filter and, in V [G], let 〈QPξ | ξ ≤ κ〉 be the
iteration given by Lemma 8.1. Let H ⊆ QPκ be a V [G]-generic filter. By Lemma 8.1
(5) and (7), δ remains supercompact in Vκ[G][H] and Vκ[G][H] |= ZFC. Hence,
by a classical ZFC result of Woodin (see [28]) there is, in some outer model N , a
Vκ[G][H]-generic filter J ⊆ Col(ω,<δ), for which there is an elementary embedding
j : CVκ[G][H] → CVκ[G][H][J].
Let X be Vδ as computed in V . Since Col(ω,<X) and Col(ω,<δ) are forcing-
equivalent in Vκ[G][H], we may fix a Vκ[G][H]-generic filter K0 ⊆ Col(ω,<X) such
that CVκ[G][H][J] = CVκ[G][H][K0].
Claim 8.3. There is some Vκ[G]-generic filter K ⊆ Col(ω,<X) such that
CVκ[G][H][K0] = CVκ[G][K].
Proof. Let Hδ = H ∩QPδ . Since QPκ/Hδ is δ-closed in V [G][Hδ] (Lemma 8.1 (4) and
(5)), each Col(ω,<X)-name in Vκ[G][H] for an ω-sequence of ordinals is equivalent
to such a name in Vκ[G][Hδ]: every such name is equivalent to the canonical name
x˙ for an ω-sequence where, for each n < ω, x˙(n) consists of pairs 〈p, αˇ〉, for p a
condition in Col(ω,<X) and α an ordinal, and where the set of such p’s forms an
antichain of Col(ω,<X) and is therefore of size less than δ. Hence CVκ[G][H][K0] =
CVκ[G][Hδ][K0]. But QPδ clearly embeds completely in Col(ω,<X)×Col(ω,<X), and
therefore also in Col(ω,<X) since Col(ω,<X) ∼= Col(ω,<X) × Col(ω,<X), from
which the conclusion follows. 
The above claim finishes the proof since QPκ is σ-closed in V [G], by Lemma 8.1
(4), and therefore CVκ[G][H] = CVκ[G]. 
Similarly, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 8.4 (ZF+DC). Suppose δ < κ are supercompact cardinals. Then there is,
in some outer model, a V -generic K ⊆ Col(ω,<Vδ), together with an elementary
embedding
j : CVκ → CVκ[K]
The main theorem in this section is the following.
Theorem 8.5 (ZF + DC). Suppose for every closed and unbounded Π2-definable
class C of ordinals there is a supercompact cardinal κ ∈ C. Then, for every set-
forcing P and every V -generic filter G ⊆ P, if V [G] |= DC, then the structures
(CV ;∈, r)r∈RV and (CV [G];∈, r)r∈RV have the same Σ2-theory.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that P forces that (CV ;∈, r)r∈RV and
(CV [G˙];∈, r)r∈RV disagree on the truth value of some sentence ∃x∀yϕ(x, y), where
ϕ is a restricted formula. By our large cardinal assumption we may then fix a
supercompact cardinal κ such that
(CVκ ;∈, r)r∈RV |= ∃x∀yϕ(x, y) ⇐⇒ (CVκ[G];∈, r)r∈RV |= ¬∃x∀yϕ(x, y)
and such that there is a supercompact cardinal δ < κ such that P ∈ Vδ.
We show that (CVκ ;∈, r)r∈RV and (CVκ[G];∈, r)r∈RV are elementarily equivalent,
which will be a contradiction.
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Let X be Vδ as computed in V . By Lemma 8.2 and Lemma 8.4 we know that
there are, in some outer model, filters K,K ′ ⊆ Col(ω,<X) which are V -generic
and V [G]-generic, respectively, for which there are elementary embeddings
j : CVκ → CVκ[K] and j′ : CVκ[G] → CVκ[G][K′].
Since P× Col(ω,<X) and Col(ω,<X) are forcing–equivalent, there is a V -generic
filter K ′′ ⊆ Col(ω,<X) such that Vκ[G][K ′] = Vκ[K ′′]. But then, by the weak
homogeneity of Col(ω,<X), the theories of (CVκ ;∈, r)r∈RV and (CVκ[G];∈, r)r∈RV
are the same. 
Using a similar argument one can prove the following.
Theorem 8.6 (ZF+ DC). Suppose there is, for every closed and unbounded class
of ordinals C, a supercompact cardinal κ such that κ ∈ C. Then, for every set-
forcing P and every V -generic filter G ⊆ P, if V [G] |= DC, then the structures
(CV ;∈, r)r∈RV and (CV [G];∈, r)r∈RV are elementarily equivalent.
Note the second order character of the hypothesis of Theorem 8.6. This hypothe-
sis can of course be taken to be an infinite scheme asserting that for every formula
Θ(x) with parameters defining a closed and unbounded class of ordinals there is
some supercompact cardinal κ such that Θ(κ). Many reasonable large cardinal
assumption could be used here in place of this. Nevertheless, it is not clear to us
whether the existence of one supercompact cardinal suffices to yield the conclusion.
The following version of Theorem 8.5 for L(R) can be derived by the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 8.5 together with the fact that, under the
existence of a supercompact cardinal, R# exists in any set-forcing extension, and
together with Woodin’s classical result that the Axiom of Determinacy holds in
L(R) assuming ZFC and the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals below a
measurable cardinal.
Theorem 8.7 (ZF + DC). Suppose there are two supercompact cardinals. Then,
for every set-forcing P and every V -generic filter G ⊆ P-generic filter G over V , if
V [G] |= DC, then
(1) the structures (L(R)V ;∈, r)r∈RV and (L(R)V [G];∈, r)r∈RV are elementarily
equivalent, and
(2) the Axiom of Determinacy holds in L(R)V [G].
9. Some concluding remarks
The construction of symmetric submodels of forcing extensions—also known as
symmetric extensions—is another way to use forcing to prove independence over
base theories T . Such a symmetric submodel is a model N such that M ⊆ N ⊆
M [G], for a ground model M satisfying our base theory and a generic filter G over
M .37 When T is ZFC, we of course do not get anything new by looking at symmetric
extensions. The reason is that if M and N both satisfy ZFC, then N is itself a
forcing extension of M . On the other hand, if we drop the Axiom of Choice from
our foundation, then the construction of symmetric extensions becomes a genuine
new method for proving independence. In particular, retreating to a foundation
which does not incorporate Choice allows for a richer and more complex generic
absoluteness project; now we can also ask if such and such hypothesis implies that
all symmetric extensions of V (of some nice form) agree with V on the theory of
the Chang model, or we can ask Question 9.2 below, etc.
37It should be remarked that not every such intermediate model is a symmetric extension, as
was shown by the second author in [15].
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In this context, one first outcome of foundational significance from our result
is that, in the presence of sufficiently strong large cardinals, the theory of the
Chang model is invariant not also under DC-preserving forcing, but also under
DC-preserving symmetric submodels of DC-preserving forcing extensions.38
Theorem 9.1. Suppose thatM satisfies ZF+DC and the hypothesis of Theorem 8.6.
Let M [G] be a generic extension of M such that M [G] also satisfies DC, and let
N be a corresponding DC-preserving symmetric extension. Then CN and CM are
elementarily equivalent.
Proof. As we remarked in footnote 36, the relevant large cardinal hypothesis is
preserved when moving from M to N . It follows, therefore, that N will satisfy the
hypothesis of Theorem 8.6. By a theorem of Grigorieff in [6], M [G] is a generic
extension of N . As we assumed that all three models satisfy DC, this is a DC-
preserving forcing extension, so by Theorem 8.6, CN and CM [G] are elementarily
equivalent, as well as CM and CM [G]. As elementary equivalence is, well, an equiv-
alence relation, it follows that CM and CN are also elementarily equivalent. 
This observation leads to the following question.
Question 9.2. Suppose that M satisfies ZF + DC and that the theory of the
Chang model is generically absolute under DC-preserving set-forcing. Let N be a
DC-preserving symmetric extension of M . Is CM elementarily equivalent to CN?
It should be noted that generic absoluteness, in general, does not imply the
existence of a proper class of large cardinals in the ground model. In fact, it does
not imply even the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. For example, suppose V
is a model of ZFC in which there is a supercompact cardinal κ but there are no
inaccessible cardinals above κ. Suppose G is a Col(ω1, <κ)-generic filter over V .
Then generic absoluteness for the Chang model holds in V [G] but in V [G] there
are no inaccessible cardinals.
The proofs of our main results in the previous section can be seen as an illustra-
tion of the thesis that, in choiceless contexts, one obtains fragments of choice from
sufficiently strong large cardinal axioms (see [29]). Roughly speaking, they show
that if DC holds and a large enough supply of supercompact cardinals is available,
then one can force AC, over suitable initial segments Vα of the universe, while pre-
serving large cardinals by a forcing—and here is a crucial point—which does not
add ω-sequences of ordinals and therefore leaves the corresponding versions of the
Chang model unchanged. One can then appeal to the classical arguments for prov-
ing generic absoluteness for this inner model over ZFC. The reason we needed to
force full choice, at least over some suitable Vα, is that in the classical arguments for
proving generic absoluteness at this level—which we ultimately appeal to—we need
Łoś’s Theorem, between V and some generic ultrapower of V , and Łoś’s Theorem
is not provable in ZF+ DC.39
The extra large cardinal strength—with respect to the large cardinals used in
the classical proofs, namely Woodin cardinals—in our present proofs, coming from
the supercompact cardinals, is put to work at forcing full choice. It is perhaps
interesting to note that no reduction in the large cardinals needed seems to be
available to our arguments if one replaces DC by some higher version DCλ of it,
for some fixed infinite cardinal λ, even if we restrict to forcing notions preserving
DCλ, as we will still need to force AC in order to be able to apply Łoś’s Theorem.
38See also [16] for a discussion about DC-preserving symmetric extensions.
39By the work of Howard in [12], AC is equivalent to the conjunction of Łoś’s Theorem and
the Boolean Prime Ideal theorem, and by [23] the Boolean Prime Ideal theorem is consistent with
DC together with the failure of AC, and thus ZF+ DC does not prove Łoś’s Theorem.
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It is only when we throw in the Axiom of Choice that we manage to drop our large
cardinal assumption from many supercompact cardinals down to Woodin cardinals.
On the other hand, and as we saw in section 7, DC is provably needed if we are
to derive generic absoluteness for the Chang model relative to any large cardinals
whatsoever. The place where our argument breaks down if we remove DC from our
hypotheses is that we will still be able to force ZFC over initial segments Vα of V ,
but we will definitely change the Chang model when doing so as we cannot assume,
in the absence of DC, that the forcing for getting AC is ω1-distributive.
The above considerations show that it is reasonable to take ZF+DC, rather than
ZFC, as a vantage point in which to look at the generic absoluteness phenomenon
for the Chang model in the presence of large cardinals. One could in fact assess the
results in this second part of the paper as showing that DC is the bare minimum
amount of choice enabling large cardinals to do their job of fixing the theory of the
Chang model. This is another argument in favour of the naturalness of ZF + DC:
This theory not only provides the right framework for developing classical analysis,
but is also the right base theory over which to derive generic absoluteness for
L(R)—where analysis lives—and even the Chang model, and thereby safeguarding
truth in this inner model—and therefore truth in analysis—from the independence
phenomenon.
We will conclude by pointing out an obstacle for extending this type of results.
The classical arguments for deriving generic absoluteness in ZFC for Chang models
from large cardinals, relative to all set-forcings, work of course only for the ω-
Chang model, which is precisely what we can capture—in the sense of leaving
unchanged—by a ω1-distributive forcing assuming DC holds.40 On the other hand it
is possible to prove reasonable generic absoluteness results for higher Chang models,
provided the scope of the result is restricted to apply to forcing extension via a
carefully chosen—but, arguably, still natural—class of partial orders. Specifically,
for any given infinite regular cardinal κ and any definable sufficiently nice class Γ
of forcing notions one can define a certain strong forcing axiom CFA(Γ)κ which
in particular implies the usual forcing axiom for meeting collections of κ-many
dense subsets of forcings in Γ. One can then prove, under the assumption that
sufficiently strong large cardinals exist and that CFA(Γ)κ holds, that the theory
of the κ-Chang model is invariant with respect to forcing extensions via partial
orders in Γ which, in addition, preserve our forcing axiom CFA(Γ)κ.41 Moreover,
for κ = ω1, many examples of nice classes Γ of forcing notions have been found for
which the corresponding forcing axiom CFA(Γ)ω1 is consistent (see [27] and [2] for
these results). It is totally unclear how one may want to try to adapt these results
to a DCλ context. The problem is that the formulation of the relevant strong forcing
axiom completely loses its power in the absence of Łoś’s Theorem, to be applied,
in the proofs, to certain ultrapowers coming from towers of ideals belonging to our
class Γ.42 Finally, a (vague) question.
Question 9.3. Can we find reasonable axioms R for which one can prove, in
ZF+DCλ, for some λ ≥ ω1, that if R holds, then no forcing notion in some natural
class which moreover preserves R can change the theory of the ω1-Chang model?
40The ω1-Chang is correct about whether or not CH holds and, as mentioned in section 7, both
CH and ¬CH can be forced while preserving all large cardinals.
41Compare this to the restriction of our generic absoluteness result for the ω-Chang model to
forcing notions preserving DC.
42To be somewhat more specific, the forcing axioms of the form CFA(Γ)κ assert that every
forcing in Γ can be completely embedded, with quotient in Γ, in a tower T of ideals on sets of
size κ such that T ∈ Γ and such that, moreover, T has certain nice structural properties within
the class of forcings in Γ.
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